Abstract Cloud computing offers scalable on-demand services to consumers with greater flexibility and lesser infrastructure investment. Since Cloud services are delivered using classical network protocols and formats over the Internet, implicit vulnerabilities existing in these protocols as well as threats introduced by newer architectures raise many security and privacy concerns. In this paper, we survey the factors affecting Cloud computing adoption, vulnerabilities and attacks, and identify relevant solution directives to strengthen security and privacy in the Cloud environment.
Cloud service stack new software [69] . NIST defines Cloud computing as a "model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and delivered with minimal managerial effort or service provider interaction" [33] . It follows a simple "pay as you go" model, which allows an organization to pay for only the service they use. It eliminates the need to maintain an in-house data center by migrating enterprise data to a remote location at the Cloud provider's site. Minimal investment, cost reduction, and rapid deployment are the main factors that drive industries to utilize Cloud services and allow them to focus on core business concerns and priorities rather than dealing with technical issues. According to [42] , 91 % of the organizations in US and Europe agreed that reduction in cost is a major reason for them to migrate to Cloud environment.
As shown in Fig. 1 , Cloud services are offered in terms of Infrastructure-as-aservice (IaaS), Platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-service (SaaS). It follows a bottom-up approach wherein at the infrastructure level; machine power is delivered in terms of CPU consumption to memory allocation. On top of it, lies the layer that delivers an environment in terms of framework for application development, termed as PaaS. At the top level resides the application layer, delivering software outsourced through the Internet, eliminating the need for in-house maintenance of sophisticated software [54] . At the application layer, the end users can utilize software running at a remote site by Application Service Providers (ASPs). Here, customers need not buy and install costly software. They can pay for the usage and their concerns for maintenance are removed.
Need for security and privacy in Cloud computing
Cloud computing is a merger of several known technologies including grid and distributed computing, utilizing the Internet as a service delivery network. The public Cloud environment is extremely complex when compared to a traditional data center environment [33] . Under the paradigm of Cloud computing, an organization surrenders direct control over major aspects of security, conferring a substantial level of trust onto the Cloud provider. A recent survey regarding the use of Cloud services made by IDC highlights that the security is the greatest challenge for the adoption of Cloud [19] .
Virtual environments are used in Cloud to achieve multi-tenancy. Vulnerabilities in virtual machines [40] pose direct threat to the privacy and security of the Cloud services. Factors that cripple usage of Cloud services are live migration of data over the Internet, entrusting a provider for data security and privacy, vulnerabilities at browser's API, vulnerabilities in the network, and export regulations for encryption.
Shared and distributed resources in the Cloud systems make it hard to develop a security model for ensuring the data security and privacy. Due to transparency issues, no Cloud provider allows its customers to implement intrusion detection or security monitoring systems extending into the management services layer behind virtualized Cloud instances. Customers may not be aware of detailed security-incidents, vulnerability, or malware reports. For example, through back channel, attackers may be able to access the content of Cloud instances and fix a kernel level rootkit [14] . Attacks on "physical level" such as reading out the random access memory of the virtualized hosts or subverting the virtualization layer [47] are known to the community. Even the host system providing the data can no longer be fully trusted since the Cloud provider owns the physical resources.
Cloud service providers often establish a Service Level Agreement (SLA) to highlight security and privacy of the related services. To an extent, there is a lack of a standard methodology to design an SLA. The authors in [5] presented SLA related to provided services and the waivers. These waivers do not really help the customers fulfilling their losses. Cloud providers like Amazon, Google, and Salesforce alike rely on detailed SLAs to guarantee security and other parameters to their customers, for example, Amazon's EC2 provides abstraction of virtual hardware to its users, covering all types of failures including operator node failure and software node failure [57] . In future, SLA based Google App Engine would likely to manage all causes of failures.
he rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks relevant to Cloud. A survey on security issues at different layers in the Cloud and their existing solutions are provided in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses the future research directions with conclusions.
Vulnerabilities, threats and attacks to Cloud computing
In Cloud, existing vulnerabilities, threats, and associated attacks raise several security concerns. Vulnerabilities in Cloud can be defined as the loopholes in the security architecture of Cloud, which can be exploited by an adversary via sophisticated techniques to gain access to the network and other infrastructure resources. A threat in the Cloud is a potential (or actual adverse) event that may be malicious or incidental (i.e. failure of a storage device), compromising Cloud resources [52] . An attack is an action to harm Cloud resources. Exploitation of vulnerabilities would affect the availability and economic benefit of Cloud computing.
Vulnerabilities in Cloud environment
In this section, we discuss major Cloud specific vulnerabilities, which pose serious threats to Cloud computing.
Vulnerabilities in virtualization/multi tenancy
Virtualization/multi-tenancy serves as the basis for Cloud computing architecture. There are mainly three types of virtualization used: OS level virtualization, application based virtualization, and Hypervisor based virtualization. In OS level virtualization, multiple guest OSs are running on a hosting OS that has visibility and control on each guest OS. In such types of configuration, an attacker can get control on the entire guest OSs by compromising the host OS. In application based virtualization, virtualization is enabled on the top layer of the host OS. In this type of configuration, each VM has its guest OS and related applications. Application based virtualization also suffers from the same vulnerability as in OS based vulnerabilities. Hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is just like code embedded to host OS. Such code may contain native errors. This code is available at boot time of the host OS to control multiple guest OSs. If the hypervisor is compromised, then the entire controlled guest OSs can be compromised. Vulnerabilities in virtualization or hypervisor allows an attacker to perform cross-VM side-channel attacks and DoS attacks. For instance, a malformed code in Microsoft's Hyper-V run by an authenticated user in one of the VM caused a DoS attack [63] .
Cloud providers thrive to maintain a maximum level of isolation between Virtual machine (VM) instances including isolation between inter-user processes. By compromising the lower layer hypervisor, an attacker can gain control over installed VMs. BLUEPILL [46] , SubVirt [26] , and DKSM [3] are all examples of attacks on the virtual layer. Through these attacks, hackers can modify the installed hypervisor and gain control over the host.
Another event is a vulnerability found in the memory management of Microsoft virtual PC. This resulted in user programs running in the guest OS having read/write access to bypass security mechanisms like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Safe Structured Error Handling (SafeSEH), and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [59] .
Vulnerabilities in Internet protocol
Vulnerabilities in Internet protocols may prove to be an implicit way of attacking the Cloud system that include common types of attacks like man-in-the-middle attack, IP spoofing, ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning, RIP attacks, and flooding. ARP poisoning is one of the well-known vulnerabilities in Internet protocols. Using this vulnerability, malicious VM can redirect all the inbound and outbound traffic of a co-located VM to the malicious VM since ARP does not require Proof-of-Origin. On the other hand, there are vulnerabilities of the HTTP protocol. HTTP is a web application protocol that requires the session state. Many techniques are used for session handling. However, they are vulnerable to session-riding and session hijacking. These vulnerabilities are certainly relevant to Cloud. TCP/IP has some "unfixable flaws" such as "trusted machine" status of machines that have been in contact with each other, and the tacit assumption that routing tables on routers will not be maliciously altered [20] . Such attack scenarios becomes critical for public Clouds, as the general backbone for Cloud provision is the Internet.
Unauthorized access to management interface
In Cloud, users have to manage their subscription including Cloud instance, data upload or data computation through a management interface, e.g. AWS management console [2] . Unauthorized access to such a management interface may become very critical for a Cloud system. Unlike traditional network systems, higher number of administrators and users for a Cloud system increases the probability for unauthorized access. Advances in the cryptanalysis override the security provided by cryptographic algorithms, which may turn strong encryption into a weak encryption. Insecure or outdated cryptographic vulnerabilities are also relevant to Cloud since it is not advisable to use Cloud without using cryptography to protect data security and privacy in the Cloud. For example, a cryptographic hole discovered in Amazon's EC2 management interface by performing signature-wrapping and cross site scripting (XSS) attacks, whereby interfaces were used to manage Cloud resources are hijacked. Such attacks allow attackers to create, modify, and delete machine images, and change administrative passwords and settings [41] . Recent research [55] has shown that successfully attacking a Cloud control interface can allow an attacker to gain complete control over an account including on all the data stored.
Injection vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities like SQL injection flaw, OS injection flaw, and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) injection flaw are used to disclose application components. Such vulnerabilities are the outcomes of defects in design and architecture of applications. These data may be the organization's applications or private data of other organization's applications residing on the same Cloud.
Vulnerabilities in browsers and APIs
Cloud providers publish a set of software interfaces (or APIs) that customers can use to manage and interact with Cloud services. Service provisioning, management, orchestration, and monitoring are performed using these interfaces via clients (e.g. Web browser). Security and availability of Cloud services depend on the security of these APIs. Examples of browser based attacks (HTML based services) are SSL certificate spoofing, attacks on browser caches and phishing attacks on mail clients [61] . APIs should support all key agreement methods specified in the WS-Security family of standards, since the resulting keys must be stored directly in the browser. This could be done by enhancing the security of APIs, e.g. PKCS#11.
For providing security to Cloud services and resources, these vulnerabilities should be tested (and removed) before delivering Cloud services to the user. In Table 1, we summarize the vulnerabilities relevant to Cloud computing and their associated effects.
Threats to Cloud computing
Cloud security alliance in [61] presented a primary draft for threats relevant to the security architecture of Cloud services. We discuss here some potential threats relevant to Cloud and relevant mitigation directives. 
Unauthorized access to management interface
An intruder can gain access control and can take advantage of services to harbor attacks. Access to administrative interface can be more critical.
Injection vulnerabilities
Unauthorized disclosure of private data behind applications.
Vulnerabilities in browsers and APIs Allow unauthorized service access.
Changes to business model
Cloud computing changes the way in which IT services are delivered. As servers, storage and applications are provided by off-site external service providers, organizations need to evaluate the risks associated with the loss of control over the infrastructure. Data traversing over geographical boundaries are subjected to different federal laws. This is one of the major threats which hinder the usage of Cloud computing services. A reliable end-to-end encryption and appropriate trust management scheme can simplify such a threat to some extent.
Abusive use of Cloud computing
Cloud computing provides several utilities including bandwidth and storage capacities. Some vendors also give a predefined trial period to use their services. However, they do not have sufficient control over the attackers, malicious users or spammers that can take advantages of the trials. These can often allow an intruder to plant a malicious attack and prove to be a platform for serious attacks. Areas of concern include password and key cracking, launching dynamic attack points, DDoS, Captcha solving farms, etc. Such threats affect the IaaS and PaaS service models. For protection, initial registration should be through proper validation/verification and through stronger authentication. In addition to this, the user's network traffic should be monitored comprehensively.
Insecure interfaces and API
Cloud providers often publish a set of APIs to allow their customers to design an interface for interacting with Cloud services. These interfaces often add a layer on top of the framework, which in turn would increase the complexity of Cloud. Such interfaces allow vulnerabilities (in the existing API) to move to the Cloud environment.
Improper use of such interfaces would often pose threats such as clear-text authentication, transmission of content, improper authorizations, etc. Such type of threat may affect the IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS service models. This can be avoided by using a proper security model for Cloud provider's interface and ensuring strong authentication and access control mechanism with encrypted transmission.
Malicious insiders
Most of the organizations hide their policies regarding the level of access to employees and their recruitment procedure for employees. However, using a higher level of access, an employee can gain access to confidential data and services. Due to lack of transparency in Cloud provider's process and procedure, insiders often have the privilege. Insider activities are often bypassed by a firewall or Intrusion Detection system (IDS) assuming it to be a legal activity. However, a trusted insider may turn into an adversary. In such a situation, insiders can cause a considerable effect on Cloud service offerings, for example, malicious insiders can access confidential data and gain control over the Cloud services with no risk of detection [61] . This type of threat may be relevant to SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. To avoid this risk, more transparency is required in security and management process including compliance reporting and breach notification.
Shared technology issues/multi-tenancy nature
In multi-tenant architecture, virtualization is used to offer shared on-demand services. The same application is shared among different users having access to the virtual machine. However, as highlighted earlier, vulnerabilities in a hypervisor allow a malicious user to gain access and control of the legitimate users' virtual machine. IaaS services are delivered using shared resources, which may not be designed to provide strong isolation for multi-tenant architectures. This may affect the overall architecture of Cloud by allowing one tenant to interfere in the other, and hence affecting its normal operation. This type of threat affects IaaS. Implementation of SLA for patching, strong authentication, and access control to administrative tasks are some of the solutions to address this issue.
Data loss and leakage
Data may be compromised in many ways. This may include data compromise, deletion, or modification. Due to the dynamic and shared nature of the Cloud, such threat could prove to be a major issue leading to data theft. Examples of such threats are lack of authentication, authorization and audit control, weak encryption algorithms, weak keys, risk of association, unreliable data center, and lack of disaster recovery. This threat can applicable to SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. Solutions include security of API, data integrity, secure storage for used keys, data backup, and retention policies [61] .
Service hijacking
Service hijacking may redirect the client to an illegitimate website. User accounts and service instances could in turn make a new base for attackers. Phishing attack, fraud, exploitation of software vulnerabilities, reused credentials, and passwords may pose service or account hijacking. This threat can affect IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. Some of the mitigation strategies to address this threat include security policies, strong authentication, and activity monitoring.
Risk profiling
Cloud offerings make organizations less involved with ownership and maintenance of hardware and software. This offers significant advantages. However, this makes them unaware of internal security procedures, security compliance, hardening, patching, auditing, and logging process and expose the organization to greater risk. To avoid this Cloud provider should disclose partial infrastructure details, logs, and data. In addition to this, there should also be a monitoring and alerting system.
Identity theft
Identity theft is a form of fraud in which someone pretends to be someone else, to access resources or obtain credit and other benefits. The victim (of identity theft) can suffer adverse consequences and losses and held accountable for the perpetrator's actions. Relevant security risks include weak password recovery workflows, phishing attacks, key loggers, etc. This affects SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. The solution is to use strong authentication mechanisms. In Table 2 , we summarize threats to Cloud and directives to avoid them.
Attacks on Cloud computing
By exploiting vulnerabilities in Cloud, an adversary can launch the following attacks.
Zombie attack
Through the Internet, an attacker tries to flood the victim by sending requests from innocent hosts in the network. These types of hosts are called zombies. In the Cloud, the requests for Virtual Machines (VMs) are accessible by each user through the Internet. An attacker can flood the large number of requests via zombies. Such an attack interrupts the expected behavior of Cloud affecting availability of Cloud services. The Cloud may be overloaded to serve a number of requests, and hence exhausted, which can cause DoS (Denial of Service) or DDoS (distributed denial of service) to the servers. Cloud in the presence of attacker's flooded requests cannot serve valid user's requests. However, better authentication and authorization and IDS/IPS can provide protection against such an attack.
In the presence of flooding or zombie attack, the Cloud provider provides more computational power to serve the huge number of requests (including zombie requests). By attacking a single server, the attacker can cause an unavailability of a service. Such an attack is called DoS attack. It may affect other services. If server's resources are completely exhausted by processing the flood requests, other service instances on the same server are no longer able to perform their intended tasks. This can lead into the whole Cloud system reaching a state of full loss and cannot be able to serve any service requests coming from valid users. Such type of distributed attack is called DDoS attack. A denial of service attack against BitBucket.org, a code hosting site, caused an outage of over 19 hours of downtime during an apparent denial of service attack on the Amazon Cloud infrastructure [34] . If an attacker cannot be identified, the flooded service raises the user bill for the workload caused by the attacker. To prevent Cloud from such attacks, Intrusion detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) can be used. 
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS
Ensure strong authentication and access control mechanism with encrypted transmission.
Malicious insiders
Insider malicious activity bypassing firewall and other security model.
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS
Provide transparency for security and management process.
Use compliance reporting and breach notification.
Shared technology issues
Allows one user to interfere other users' services by compromising hypervisor.
IaaS
Use strong authentication and access control mechanism for administrative task. Inspect vulnerability and configuration.
Data loss and leakage
Confidential data can be compromised, deleted or modified.
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS
Use secure APIs, encryption algorithms and secure keys. Apply data retention and backup policies.
Service hijacking User accounts and service instances could in turn make a new base for attackers.
Use security policies, strong authentication mechanism and activity monitoring.
Risk profiling
Internal security procedures, security compliance, configuration hardening, patching, auditing and logging may be overlooked.
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS
Disclose partial logs, data and infrastructure detail. Use monitoring and alerting system for data breaches.
Identity theft An attacker can get valid user's identity to access that user's resources; and obtain credit or other benefits in that user's name.
Use strong passwords and authentication mechanism.
Service injection attack
Cloud system is responsible for determining and eventually instantiating a free-touse instance of the requested service. The address for accessing that new instance is to be communicated back to the requesting user. An adversary tries to inject a malicious service or new virtual machine into the Cloud system and can provide malicious service to users. Cloud malware affects the Cloud services by changing (or blocking) Cloud functionalities. Consider a case wherein an adversary creates his/her malicious services like SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS and adds it to the Cloud system. If an adversary succeeds to do this, then valid requests are redirected to the malicious services automatically. To defend against this type of attack, service integrity checking module should be implemented. Strong isolation between VMs may disable the attacker from injecting malicious code in the neighbor's VM.
Attacks on virtualization
There are mainly two types of attacks performed over virtualization: VM Escape and Rootkit in hypervisor. VM Escape: In this type of attack, an attacker's program running in a VM breaks the isolation layer in order to run with the hypervisor's root privileges instead with the VM privileges. This allows an attacker to interact directly with the hypervisor. Therefore, VM Escape from the isolation is provided by the virtual layer. By VM Escape, an attacker gets access to the host OS and the other VMs running on the physical machine.
Rootkit in Hypervisor: VM-based rootkits initiate a hypervisor compromising the existing host OS to a VM. The new guest OS assumes that it is running as the host OS with the corresponding control over the resources, however, in reality this host does not exist. Hypervisor also creates a covert channel to execute unauthorized code into the system. This allows an attacker to control over any VM running on the host machine and to manipulate the activities on the system.
Man-in-the Middle attack
If secure socket layer (SSL) is not properly configured, then any attacker is able to access the data exchange between two parties. In Cloud, an attacker is able to access the data communication among data centers. Proper SSL configuration and data communication tests between authorized parties can be useful to reduce the risk of Man-in-the-Middle attack.
Metadata spoofing attack
In this type of attack, an adversary modifies or changes the service's Web Services Description Language (WSDL) file where descriptions about service instances are stored. If the adversary succeeds to interrupt service invocation code from WSDL file at delivering time, then this attack can be possible. To overcome such an attack, information about services and applications should be kept in encrypted form. Strong authentication (and authorization) should be enforced for accessing such critical information.
Phishing attack
Phishing attacks are well known for manipulating a web link and redirecting a user to a false link to get sensitive data. In Cloud, it may be possible that an attacker use the cloud service to host a phishing attack site to hijack accounts and services of other users in the Cloud.
Backdoor channel attack
It is a passive attack, which allows hackers to gain remote access to the compromised system. Using backdoor channels, hackers can be able to control victim's resources and can make it a zombie for attempting a DDoS attack. It can also be used to disclose the confidential data of the victim. Better authentication and isolation between VMs can provide protection against such attacks. Table 3 summarizes the above presented attacks, their effects, and mitigation directives.
Security issues at different layers in Cloud
Above presented threats/attacks directly or indirectly affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Cloud resources as well as services at different layers and raises several security concerns as shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2 , we explore each layer (as shown in Fig. 1 ) of Cloud with associated security concerns. Therefore, we classified security concerns based on different layers of the Cloud infrastructure viz; application level, network level, data storage level, virtualization level, authentication and access control level, trust level, compliance, audit and regulations level. Application level risks directly affect the security of Cloud applications at the user layer. Network level threats or intrusions affect the overall security of Cloud services, data as well as physical resources. One can easily gain access to another user's resources or services by monitoring the network traffic in the Cloud. Attacks on data storage directly affect the security of the user's data (at rest or in-transit) including application data and sensitive data. Virtualization level risks directly affect the data storage level security and application level security. Authentication and access control level risks affect the security of legitimate user's services and resources. Trust level risks directly affect the security of data-in-transit and migrating applications. Auditing, compliance, and regulations levels threats directly affect the user's data privacy, confidentiality, and integrity.
Application level security issues
Application level security refers to the usage of software and hardware resources for providing security to applications such that the attackers are not able to get control over applications and make desirable changes to their format. Since Web applications and SaaS are tightly coupled with providing Cloud services, the security and availability of general cloud services are dependent upon the security of Web browsers, APIs and vulnerability free applications. A Web browser is the platform independent client program that is mostly used to access the Cloud services (SaaS), web applications, web pages, or web 2.0. It uses SSL/TLS protocols for secure transmission and authentication of data. Therefore, attacks on browser based Cloud authentication directly affect the security of Cloud applications. Any attacker can get access to other user's XML tokens (authentication related credentials in the browser) and accesses the services of the victim. One of the solutions viz; XML signature and XML encryption can be used to enhance browser security [24] . However, the XML Signature Wrapping attack enables the attacker to change the content of the signed part without invalidating the signature, for example, using XML signature wrapping attack (due to exploitation of cross-site XSS scripting vulnerabilities), it is possible to hijack some live Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts (that uses SOAP and REST interfaces) [23] . Therefore, XML signature or XML Encryption fails to provide browser level security. To address wrapping attacks, the authors in [72] recommended the use of a redundant bit (STAMP bit) with the SOAP header. If any adversary infers the message during transmission, the STAMP will be changed. On the server side, first STAMP bit is checked and if modified STAMP bit is found, then in the browser, new signature value is generated that is sent back to the server to modify the authenticity checking. Using this approach, an adversary cannot interrupt the customer request with a duplication of the SOAP message because the previous signature value is already altered. For this purpose, only a random signature value generator is needed in the browser end and only the extra message overhead of one bit is required for an authenticity check. However, such approaches are not applied to current Cloud systems and it is still an open challenge to provide a sufficient browser level security.
Hu et al. [21] presented an ontology-based Semantic Access Control Policy Language (SACPL) for describing access control policies (ACPs) in Cloud computing environment. In this approach, syntax elements of XACML, such as subject, object, action and attribute variables, are annotated with semantic information using the Access Control Oriented Ontology System (ACOOS) and some syntax elements are added such as priority and confidentiality. This approach can solve the problem of semantic inter-operability and mutual understanding on the distributed access control policies of resources when cross organizations are involved. However, it is mentioned that this approach does not provide automatic conflict resolution for rules or policies and semantics-based access control mechanism for variable granularity [21] .
Diallo et al. [12] proposed an approach that extends middleware by incorporating CloudProtect, CloudProtect stores user's application data in encrypted form. It protects the privacy of user's application data. Some applications require access to the data in plain text format. Therefore, it is cumbersome to encrypt and decrypt data. CloudProtect maintains the policies defining which data should be in plain text form and which data should be encrypted on the server. The policies are defined based the user behavior. It offers key management and secure sharing of data.
Other key security issues at the application level are service availability and integrity of workload state.
Service availability
Temporary or permanent loss of services and DoS/DDoS attacks are the main threats affecting availability of Cloud services. For better QoS, services should be available as promised when they are requested. There are few incidents reported in literature. One such incident is the database cluster failure caused at Salesforce.com [17] . In February 2011, Gmail went down for a few hours and due to service disruption, 0.29 % of Gmail users were affected and lost their previous emails and other data [56] . On March 28, 2011, thousands of users registered at Intuit (which offers financial and tax preparation software and related services) experienced an outage for 2 to 5 days during the network configuration update and scheduled maintenance. As a result, customers were blocked to access offered services [56] . To address such issues, proper configuration of an IDS/IPS can be investigated.
Integrity of workload state
The integrity for the state of a workload should be preserved to ensure expected results. Applications involving workflows are required to store temporary results of computation at different levels. There is no standard mechanism used to secure such sensitive files. If these sensitive files are disclosed to an attacker, he/she may be able to threaten the expected behavior of the application. A provenance based approach [13] can be used for securing the application data flow among different sites. This approach provides confidentiality and integrity for data flow processing applications. As shown in Fig. 3 [13] , composer (C) encrypts information regarding the flow of data. At each hop (S1) decrypts the next hop's (S2) information and send the data. Here, a single hop cannot see the whole topology. Malicious hop cannot be able to exploit the entire flow of data. This approach can be used to provide a solution for integrity of data flow application delivery in the Cloud. 
Network level security issues
The network is the backbone of Cloud, and hence vulnerabilities in network directly affect the security of Cloud. As shown in Fig. 4 , security issues at network level should be considered in terms of both external and internal networks. An adversary outside the Cloud network often performs DoS or DDoS attacks to affect the availability of Cloud services and resources. DoS/DDoS attacks reduce the bandwidth and increases the congestion causing poor service to the users. Due to the distributed nature of the Cloud, it is hard to prevent DoS/DDoS and Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS can be called as HTTP and XML based DDoS) [49] attacks.
Some common attacks at the network layer are DNS poisoning attack, Sniffer attack, Port scanning, Cross site scripting, ARP spoofing, IP spoofing, and phishing attack, which are executed to gain access of Cloud resources. Internal network attacker (authorized users or users within the cloud network) can easily get access to other user's resources without being detected. An insider has higher privileges and knowledge (related to network, security mechanism, and resources to attack) than the external attacker. Therefore, it is easy for an insider to penetrate an attack than external attackers. Major security issues at network level include vulnerabilities in Internet protocols, authorization, and authentication, intrusions, backdoor attack, session hijacking, and clear data transmission. To address some of the issues at the network level, major Cloud providers (like Amazon, Window Azure, Rack Space, Eucalyptus, etc.) are running their applications behind firewall. However, it only provides security at boundary of network and cannot detect the internal attacks. Network based intrusion detection system (NIDS) can be integrated to address some of the security issues. However, a NIDS should be configured for detecting external intrusions as well as internal intrusions. It should also be capable of detecting intrusions from encrypted traffic. In the following, we see the existing research efforts to address network security issues in Cloud.
Through experiments and implementation, the authors in [20] surveyed about the security solutions that can be applied to detect ARP spoofing attacks. They concluded that XArp 2 [70] tool is an efficient security solution that can accurately detect ARP spoofing attacks. In [36] , we discussed existing NIDS approaches to Cloud. For example, Lo et al. [30] introduced a snort based intrusion detection system framework [30] for Cloud system. As shown in Fig. 5 [30] , an IDS module is installed on each region of Cloud environment. If an intrusion is detected at any region, it alerts other regions by using a cooperative agent. Other regions cooperatively compute severity of that and then differentiate it as an attack or normal activity based on a threshold. This approach is suitable for preventing Cloud system from single-point-of-failure caused by DDoS attack. However, it needs substantial computational effort.
Bakshi and Yogesh [4] proposed a method to secure VMs in Cloud from DDoS attack using an IDS. In this approach, Snort based NIDS tool is installed on the VM. If any suspicious activity is detected, it notifies the source IP of that activity and blocks packets coming from that IP. If DDoS attack is found, it transfers the service running on affected VM to another VM and blocks all the packets.
Mazzariello et al. [32] presented Snort based misuse detection in open source Eucalyptus Cloud environment. In this approach, Snort is deployed at a primary controller managing cloud instances called cloud controller as well as on the physical machines (hosting virtual machines) to detect intrusions coming from external networks. This approach solves the problem of deploying multiple instances of IDS. Although it is a fast and cost effective solution, it can only detect known attacks since only Snort is involved.
Sandar et al. [49] introduced a new type of DDoS attack, called Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) in Cloud services and proposed a solution framework for EDoS protection. EDoS attack can be called as HTTP and XML based DDoS attack. EDoS protection framework uses firewall and puzzle server to detect EDoS attack. A firewall is used to detect EDoS at the entry point of Cloud, whereas the puzzle server is used to authenticate the user. In this work, the authors demonstrated the EDoS attack in Amazon EC2 Cloud. However, it is not an efficient solution since it uses only traditional firewalls. Research is still needed to detect EDoS attacks in the Cloud.
Lue et al. [28] integrate an intrusion detection system into a Grid, which uses existing grid resources for detecting strong DDoS attacks. In this approach, traffic from multiple switches is collected by multiple dispatchers and is sent for intrusion detection using scheduler. Scheduler forwards that traffic to the intrusion detector, if load on any detector is low. This solution is used to overcome possible performance bottlenecks and deals with the distribution of load, which requires several nodes to be utilized.
To overcome limitations existing in above presented approaches, further work related to NIDS is needed to provide fully secure network environment in the Cloud. One another challenging problem related to the Cloud-NIDS is the monitoring and capturing of the network traffic. This is due to the multi-tenancy and distributed nature of Cloud computing.
Data storage level security issues
The following aspects of data security are still open challenges: data-in-transit, dataat-rest, data lineage, data remanence, data provenance, data recovery, data location, data breaches, and investigative support.
In case of data-in-transit, adversary in network affects the confidentiality and integrity of data. The biggest risks for data-in-transit include poor encryption technology and network protocols. Simply going for an encryption technology does not serve the purpose.
Data at rest (stored in Cloud storage) needs physical, logical, and personnel access control policies. Some examples related to Cloud failures on data security are: Data center of Hosting.com at New Jersey went down for few hours due to software bug in a Cisco switch [56] (June 2010). Amazon's EC2 and RDS services have experienced an outage for 4 days (April 2011). Amazon reported that its Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes are trapped, which affected the EC2 instances trying to use affected volumes [35] . Data at rest (stored in Cloud storage) is generally commingled with other users' data. Even after using techniques to prevent unauthorized access, data at rest can be compromised through exploitation of application vulnerabilities. The main problem with data-at-rest in the cloud is loss of control, if a non-authorized user accesses the data in a shared environment. Storage devices with in-built encryption techniques failed to prevent unauthorized access since the encryption and decryption keys can be compromised by a malicious user. A lockbox approach, wherein the actual keys are stored in a lockbox and there is a separate key to access that lockbox can be used in the above mentioned case. However, again there is a need for security of a lockbox key. This poses key management challenges.
Tracing the data path is known as data lineage and it is important for auditing purposes in the cloud. It is a challenging task to provide data lineage. Since the data flow is no longer linear in a virtualized environment within the Cloud, it complicates the process of mapping the data flow to ensure integrity of the data. Due to the shared environment, maintaining the integrity of data is the most challenging task in the Cloud.
Data-Remanence refers to the data left out in case of data transfer or data removal. It causes minimal security threats viz; disclosure of sensitive information, data sold to others, etc.
Data recovery is one of the most challenging problems. Data can be lost due to accidental damage or natural disaster to storage. It poses a risk to data availability for users.
Data location. Tracing location of data is difficult in the Cloud since user's data are dynamically migrated from one region (or country) to another region (or country). It increases risk of data privacy and security since data owner loses the control over his/her data. Data breaches and investigative support: It is difficult to investigate inappropriate or illegal activity, because logging and data for multiple customers are co-located and may also be spread across an ever-changing set of hosts and data centers.
Lin et al. [29] proposed a data protection framework that is composed of three modules named policy ranking, policy integration, and policy enforcement. Policy ranking module is used to find satisfying users' privacy policy requirements. For a policy ranking module, there are three models recommended: (i) User-oriented ranking model; (ii) Service-provider-oriented ranking model; and (iii) Broker based ranking model. After finding the best service provider, the proposed centralized model (for policy integration module) creates policies to be agreed by involving parties. Finally, the policy enforcement module (uses either tight coupling or loose coupling) examines whether the confidentiality of data and policies are guaranteed at any time and at any location or not.
Mowbray et al. [38] proposed a client based privacy manager, incorporated features like obfuscation, preference settings, data access, feedback, and personae. Obfuscation is used to modify some data fields of database before sending it to Cloud for processing. So, an attacker using the same application would be unable to reveal those data. Only owners of those data can de-obfuscate those data. Using preference settings, set of policy can be incorporated for those data. Policies and data are shared with sender and receiver using cryptographic techniques. Data access will allow users to access personal information for checking accuracy or any violation of privacy. Feedback module monitors personal data transferring from the platform and manages feedback including usage of personal data in the Cloud. Personae module offers a choice for revealing or not revealing different data fields. Data privacy is fully dependent on data owner.
Naruchitparames et al. [39] proposed a blind processing service using the trusted computing mechanism to provide improved privacy and integrity for the user's data. Blind processing is used to create a secure channel between dedicated processes that are concealed from the rest of the system including root processes, system administrators, and end-users. This approach provides several layers of abstraction in which a remote system is ensured to have the correct hardware, a trusted computing base, correct credentials, and a trustworthy state. However, it requires more hardware for processing. Practical analysis of this approach is not reported.
Abbasy et al. [1] proposed an approach that hides sensitive data using DNA reference sequences. In this approach, first data are converted from binary to DNA Nucleotide sequences for encrypting the data. Then complementary rules on encrypted data are applied. After that index of each couple of Nucleotides in DNA reference sequence are found. These sequences contain encrypted data. For decrypting these data, the same procedure is followed in a bottom-up manner. This approach provides security and privacy of user's data in the resource sharing environment. However, if the DNA sequence is altered or modified, it is difficult to retrieve original data.
Stolfo et al. [58] proposed an approach that uses user behavior and decoy information to mitigate insider data theft. In this approach, data access patterns are monitored by profiling the user behavior. Decoy documents that are stored in the Cloud along with the user's real data act as sensors to detect illegitimate access. When unauthorized access is found, it is verified using challenge questions.
Virtualization level security issues
In the virtualized (multi-tenant) environment, multiple OSs run concurrently on a host computer using hypervisor. Existing vulnerabilities [40] in a VM that are distributed throughout the physical and virtual enterprise resources allow cyber attacker, malware, or other threats to remotely exploit. VMs' collocation also increases the security risk.
As the number of guest operating systems (OSs) running on a hypervisor increase, the security concerns with that newer guest OSs also increase. Because it is not possible to keep track of all guest OSs, and hence maintaining the security of those OSs is difficult. It may happen that a guest system tries to run a malicious code on the host system and bring the system down or take full control of the system and block access to other guest OSs. There are risks associated with sharing the same physical infrastructure between a set of multiple users, even one being malicious can cause threats to the others using the same infrastructure.
If a hacker is able to get control over the hypervisor, he can make changes to any of the guest OSs and get control over all the data passing through the hypervisor. Isolation between two VMs is not completely adequate by current virtual machine monitors (VMMs). By compromising the lower layer hypervisor vulnerabilities, an attacker can gain control over installed VMs, for example, Bluepill, SubVirt, and DKSM are some well-known attacks on the virtual layer. This is still an open problem to prevent such threats.
Virtualization based malware and rootkit: New generation of rootkits that benefit from the processor technology that allows an attacker to insert an additional hypervisor between the hardware and the software. The hypervisor takes control of the system and converts the original operating system into a virtual guest on the fly. In contrast to software-based virtualization, this kind of hijacking does not need a restart, and that makes it all the more difficult to detect the intrusion.
Sharing of VM images in Cloud introduces security risks. The owner of an image is concerned about confidentiality (e.g. unauthorized accesses to the image). The user of an image is concerned about safety (e.g. a malicious image that is capable of corrupting or stealing the user's own private data). For example, instances running on Amazon's EC2 platform can be easily compromized by performing various attacks like the signature-wrapping attack, cross site scripting (XSS) attack, and DoS attack. This allows attackers to create, modify, and delete VM images, and change administrative passwords and settings that are put into instances with EC2 for S3 access. There is a risk of non-compliance (e.g. running unlicensed software or software with expired licenses). The administrator of Cloud is concerned with the security and compliance of the Cloud as a whole and the integrity of the images. There is a risk of damages caused by malware contained in any image stored in the repository.
There should be a standard mechanism for checking integrity of guest VMs for successfully executing workload and avoiding interruption of computation, data loss, and misuse of resources.
As shown in Fig. 6 [31] , host based transparent Cloud protection system (TCPS) monitors integrity of Cloud components. TCPS is placed between guest's kernel and the virtualization layers, which monitors guest VMs and protects them against intruders and attacks. It also addresses transparency problems in the Cloud. [31] Authors in [68] provided solution for securing virtual image repository and access control. As shown in Fig. 7 , access control mechanism is used to reduce risk of unauthorized access to publisher's VM images. Image filters are used to remove user's personal information for providing privacy at publishing and retrieving time, where the tracking system is used to disable malicious attempts by tracing versions of images and their operations. Also, image repository is maintained by periodically implementing virus scan and fixing vulnerabilities.
Volokyta et al. [62] proposed a mechanism of monitoring of virtual machines to increase security of Cloud resources that can be affected by the attacks. Using a detector, the host OS is monitored for integrity checking. All the malicious activities are analyzed by this detector and logged into a log file. Using periodic checksum verification of executable file and libraries, the integrity of Cloud resources is checked by the virtual machine monitor (VMM). In this approach, all the monitoring activities are done through VMM. However, if hypervisor (or VMM) is compromised, guest OSs (running on that VMM) can be compromised.
Authentication and access control level security issues
In Cloud computing, the client's information is transmitted over the Internet, which poses data ownership issues [31] . As this information is processed outside the enterprise, it brings an inherent level of risk.
This issue is addressed by providing support for security assertion markup language (SAML) federation protocol (which contains authentication credentials in the form of SAML assertions) with their own authentication protocol [8] . SAML is issued to exchange information, such as assertions related to a subject or authentication Fig. 7 Securing virtual image repository and access control [68] information between the cooperating domains. The request and response messages of it are mapped over Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) relying on XML. As discussed in Sect. 3.1, using a Signature Wrapping Attack, it is possible to modify an eavesdropped message despite of it being digitally signed. Thus, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary machine commands on behalf of a legitimate user. To address such issues, data should be transmitted via secured channel and fine-grained authentication and authorization techniques can be used for preventing data from unauthorized access.
Yan et al. [71] proposed an authentication approach that uses federated identity management together with hierarchical identity-based cryptography (HIBC). It provides keys (public key and private key) distribution along with mutual authentication between parties in the Cloud. It allows users to access services from other Clouds with a single digital identity. For web services, this approach can be used to distribute public keys, while reducing SOAP header size. It is used to create a session between two parties without any message exchange. However, it creates trust issues since third party key distribution is involved.
Celesti et al. [7] addressed the identity management problem in inter-Cloud. In this approach, the third party is used as an identity provider (IDP). In order to communicate, each Cloud has to create an account using ID provided by IDP. Each Cloud performs authentication tasks on the provided ID to establish trust and gains the access to needed resources. Trust of foreign Cloud is accomplished by the IDP. The [22] limitation of this approach is that each Cloud has to trust and rely on the identity provider.
To solve third party issues, Ranchal et al. [43] proposed an approach to protect identity information without including trusted third party and using an active bundle scheme. In this approach, Samir's multi-party secrete sharing scheme is used to encrypt data. In this scheme, encrypted data and keys are shared among multiple hosts. By computing predicate over encrypted data and multi-party computing, active bundle based authentication can be done without decrypting the data.
Fine-grained access controls should be available for controlling access to sensitive data or the application code. Security officers are able to define a set of controls applied to applications depending on the data.
For controlling access to Cloud resources, standards like eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) expressing access policies can be used. Service providers like Salesforce and Google Apps are using XACML for authorization decision and access control. Authors in [37] presented a security model for restricting access to information through covert channels in the Cloud. The solution for identity management among Clouds is presented in [22] . According to the proposed protocol in [22] , Cloud user registers his/her ID with the service provider and gets a certificate with a public key. Then third party service Cloud and service providers send their certificates to each other. While requesting to third party service Cloud, the user can verify its certificate. After which, messages for third party service Cloud and service provider Cloud are produced. In produced messages, service level information is hidden for service provider, whereas ID and privileges (IOMD as shown in Fig. 8 ) are hidden for third party service Cloud. For hiding such information, dual signatures (produced by hash function and encryption using user's private key) are used. Thus, disclosure of the user's ID and privileges can be protected from service providers.
A re-encryption approach (as shown in Fig. 9 [60]) provides flexible access control mechanism in Cloud data storage. Here, data owner (Down) (who provides data to a service provider) generates private key and public key using a private key generator (PKG) for each user of these data. Then re-encryption keys corresponding to private Fig. 9 Re-encryption based approach [60] key for each user are generated using a key generator (REKG) and stored in authentication table. After which access control policies are stored in the access control matrix. Using the public key of each user, each tuple of owned database is encrypted. The authorization table is encrypted using the public key of database service provider (DSP). Encrypted database and authorization table are transferred to the DSP. By using re-encryption keys, DSP re-encrypts tuples of the database. Produced re-cipher text is decrypted only by the legal user's private key. Thus, DSP can authorize data users without seeing the data.
Echeverria et al. [15] proposed an idea to control an access of user data in the Cloud; that is called Permission-as-a-Service. It separates access control from other services to provide a separate service in the cloud. This allows users to set permissions for all data in a single location. This approach provides confidentiality of user's by encrypting them using attribute based encryption (ABE) to provide data confidentiality. When any user wants to access this data, permissions to access this data are managed via decryption keys. However, this approach is applied only for PaaS.
Mon et al. [16] combined Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) to provide the privacy and security of sensitive data of cloud users. In this approach, Cloud clients store their data based on privacy laws according to their user levels. With the use of RBAC and ABAC, the privacy manager defines the privacy policies, privacy laws, user levels, and security levels to control the data access. Using an access control list (ACL), users are granted or denied permission to access the data. In this approach, security and privacy policies are defined by the service providers, which restrict users to store all types of data since service providers are not fully trusted.
Slamanig [53] presented a dynamic accumulator based approach for privacy preserving access control to outsourced data. In this approach, the concept of access control lists (ACLs) is used to provide permissions (read, write, delete) to other users who are able to unlinkably and anonymously perform operations on outsourced data items when having these permissions. Using this approach, it can be decided that whether the users are granted or denied access. The data user can give/get access rights to/from other users, whereas the Cloud provider will not be able to identify such users and linked operations done by users. The limitation of this approach is that if the data owner wants to revoke permission from a user, then that user must have to revoke granted permission from other users. This makes it computationally complex to maintain chain of users.
Raykova et al. [44] proposed privacy enhanced access control for outsourced data. In this approach, the authors combine coarse-grained access control and fine-grained cryptographic access control. The coarse-grained access control offers an affordable communication overhead and provides privacy of information against view of the access rules and the access patterns, whereas fine-grained cryptographic access control is used at the user's side, which provides the desired access control policies. This approach offers read and write access control to the user's data.
Trust level security issues
This is one of the serious problems in the Cloud. Since users have lack of control over resources, they have to rely on trust mechanisms and contracts in conjunction with mechanisms that provide a compensation. But trust is a very fuzzy concept and very difficult to calculate in a heterogeneous environment that is assessed by a human or social trust. Contractors may be sub-contracting without user's knowledge. Limiting visibility of network and system monitoring to user poses major trust issues. Contract requirements may not be propagated down the sub-contract chain. Employees (authorized users) or malicious insiders of organizations often perform attacks that affect the confidentiality and privacy of other users' data as well as resources. Lack of public relations poses a trust issue. Data processing outside the organizations poses an inherent level of risk. There is no direct control on some service components outside the organization. Limiting visibility of network and system monitoring to user may also pose a trust issue. This issue can be addressed by providing an adequate means of visibility of the monitoring system. There should be a mechanism for managing and accessing the involved risk. Cross-site scripting, access control weaknesses, insecure storage, and insecure configuration are some of the threat examples. Advanced cryptographic techniques and signature techniques can be used to address trust issues when outsourcing data. Authors in [65] presented an approach for verifying dynamic data and securing data storage against the adversary. Using this approach, users can check correctness of their data in Cloud storage with minimum overhead.
Security issues related to auditing, regulatory compliance and laws
Audit and compliance to internal processes and external processes must be met with classified requirement and customer agreements, laws, and regulations. Therefore, such policies should be monitored. The multi-tenancy nature of Cloud increases the difficulty of monitoring and logging process of VMs. Due to the dynamic nature of the Cloud, it is difficult to audit and manage compliance by coordination with external auditing and regulatory bodies. There are different types of compliance. The risks associated with each of this compliance are discussed below.
Privacy compliance: Only owners of the data are responsible for the security and privacy of their outsourced data even if the data is held by a service provider. This is due to the various laws and regulations in different countries. It poses a risk of data security, confidentiality, and availability. This is an open problem for providing transparency and controlled environment to owners about their data.
Geographic compliance: If the tenant or cloud customer operates in the United States, Canada, or the European Union, they are subject to numerous regulatory requirements. These include control objectives for information and related technology. These laws might relate to where the data is stored or transferred, as well as how well this data is protected from a confidentiality aspect.
Most of the cloud-based services have lengthy and onerous license agreements that very few businesses and consumers read or understand in their entirety. As a result, Cloud services are often controlled by the terms and conditions that limit a user's right of control and access or give the Cloud service certain rights over the user's own data. Placing geographical and other restrictions on the collection, processing, and transfer of personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive information limit the usage of Cloud services. Privacy laws in various countries limit organizations to transfer some type of information to other countries, for example, UK businesses storing personal data with the Cloud provider like Salesforce on the basis of their standard terms and conditions could find themselves in breach of UK data protection law [48] . In the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region, Japan, Australia, and many other countries have implemented data protection laws, which require reasonable measures to protect privacy of personal data based on security guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) privacy framework [51] . In Europe, the European Economic Area (EEA) has enacted data protection laws that follow the European data protection directives [51] . A set of standards [11] like HIPAA, SOX, FDA, PCI, FISMA, GLBA, OSHA, ISO 27002, Basel II, etc. should be implemented in Cloud to address compliance issues. There is a need here to frame a unified regulatory compliance.
Wang et al. [67] proposed an approach called Oruta (one ring to rule them all) that provides a new privacy-preserving public auditing mechanism for shared data in an untrusted cloud. In this approach, the third party auditor is used that uses ring signatures to build homomorphic authenticators to verify the integrity of the shared data for a static group of users without retrieving the entire data. However, it is not an efficient solution, when user groups are dynamic. Time taken to verify information increases linearly as the number of users increases in a group. Khorshed [25] surveyed on the gaps that is slowing down cloud adoption and reviewed challenges on threat remediation. In this work, the author investigated and compared performances of several machine learning techniques to monitor insider activities in the Cloud and concluded that rule based technique C4.5 (decision tree classifier) is an efficient technique to solve the problem of monitoring insiders' activities having similar patterns of some other cyber attacks. Table 4 summarizes security issues at different levels in the Cloud environment. Security measures adopted by major Cloud providers are summarized in Table 5 [9, 10, 45] .
Future research directions
There are upcoming Cloud models that require newer research directives: -Amazon EC2 provides a web service interface to configure firewall settings, which controls network access between groups of users. -Amazon simple storage service (S3) is accessible via SSL encrypted end points. It is the user's responsibility to encrypt data before storing into S3.
Google App Engine
PaaS -JVM in a secured "sandbox" environment is used for running Java Applications, which isolate applications and security. Any executable Java byte code can be operated within the sandbox controls.
-In addition, the Python interpreter is running in a secured "sandbox" that isolates applications and security.
Window Azure
PaaS IaaS -Firewalls, filtering routers, cryptographic protection of messages, software security patch management, central monitoring, correlation and analysis systems, network segmentation, service administration access, and physical security.
-Reduces the damage to infrastructure by providing optional and mandatory "sandbox" features.
-Customers are provided security options as available in window server. Configuration and updates are controlled by SSL client certificates and protected by 128 bit encryption.
-All administrative operations are audited.
Force.com PaaS -For authentication, SAML is used on login, session security and auditing.
-Security at various levels such as Physical security, logical network security, host security, transmission level security and database security are provided.
Rack Space IaaS -Firewalls, antivirus and spam protection provided.
-SSL provided as add on service.
Go Grid IaaS -ServePath's secure infrastructure and telecom facility provided. 
Mobile Cloud computing
Mobile Cloud computing is confined to availability of Cloud computing to mobile ecosystem. These can also be extended to tablets and portable PDAs having limited processing and memory capabilities. Besides uniform network stability and device access, mobile devices raise several security and privacy concerns; an obvious case is misplacement or loss of a mobile device that can result into the major data breach.
There is a lack of platform independent languages to develop applications for mobile devices, i.e. consistent case for Android and Apple.
Encryption and key management algorithms
An unknown physical location of data in the Cloud and different laws enforced by nations to manage data make encryption and key management complex. If encryption is applied, it needs to be performed at multiple locations, within the data center, in between the data centers, or between public and private Clouds, etc. There is a strong need of improved solutions involving the users for controlling the use of their data.
In [64] , the authors propose the use of the symmetric key encryption mechanism for data security in Cloud framework. In [50] , the authors propose the use of Public Key Infrastructure for the Cloud framework. However, these approaches do not provide an efficient solution for key management due to its complexity. An identity based approach has to overcome the key management limitation. However, there is a need for more robust approaches in this context, which could extend traditional approaches like Cipher text Policy Attribute based encryption (CPABE) [6] , Key Policy Attribute based encryption (KPABE), etc. to Cloud computing.
Ad hoc Clouds
The current model of Cloud computing involves a data center approach, whereby clusters of machines are dedicated to running Cloud infrastructure software. However, there may be some resources whose utilization have been limited. A model called 'Ad hoc Cloud' [27] enables infrastructure software to be distributed over resources harvested from machines already in existence within the enterprise. This may in turn yield several benefits such as a reduction of the need for the specialized infrastructure for resilience. However, this approach would require newer architectural representations, membership control mechanism for a set of machines for ad hoc Clouds, and a newer model for maintaining scalability. Apart from these, there are more open areas for further research and require notable attention. These may include delivery of newer services like high performance computing, implementing a secure Virtual Private Network over the Cloud and Security-as-a-Service. These concepts are still in their infancy and its adoption and extension to Cloud computing would require considerable research efforts.
Conclusions
Cloud computing can bring various business benefits to organizations. However, there are many challenges related to security and privacy in the Cloud environment. Our attempt is to show various vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks hindering the adoption of Cloud computing. We have surveyed existing solutions to address security issues at different layers of the Cloud, while identifying some future challenges. It opens up space for future research to extend existing techniques and to investigate new techniques for security and privacy in mobile Cloud and ad hoc Cloud. This includes a need for a dynamic security model and better crypto (and key management) algorithms that targets different levels of security and privacy for Cloud computing.
With the increasing inter-cloud federation architectures, there will be more complex security and privacy challenges in the future. In addition to this, the compliance and regulatory challenges will continue to change as more and more business services are delivered over the Cloud. There is an immediate need for the governments across the globe to standardize some of the privacy and security requirements. Building trust in the Cloud is an interesting future area of research. With the increasing usage of the Cloud services it is possible to collect sufficient evidence from the cloud providers on the level of trust on each of their services. This can help the service providers, infrastructure providers, and the end-users to better choose the right services from the ever growing Cloud vendors.
